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Module 1: Foundations

Why AI safety and red-teaming matter

A new attack surface, real incidents, and why testing is now essential.

When you put a large language model into a product — especially one that reads untrusted content or can take actions — you introduce a genuinely new attack surface. Traditional software security assumes code and data are separate; LLMs blur that line, processing instructions and data in the same natural-language channel. That single fact drives most of what makes AI security hard, and it's why red-teaming AI systems has become essential rather than optional.

A note up front: this course is defensive and educational. It teaches the categories of attack you need to test for and defend against, and why they work — so you can secure your systems. It deliberately does not provide step-by-step exploit recipes. The goal is to make you a better defender, red-teamer, and builder of safe AI.

Why this matters now: LLMs are moving from chat boxes into agents that browse the web, read email, query databases, and call tools. Each new capability is a new way for things to go wrong. Real deployments have leaked system prompts, followed malicious instructions hidden in retrieved content, and taken actions their builders never intended. As models gain autonomy and access, the stakes rise.

The core insight — instructions and data share one channel. A classic web app keeps SQL code separate from user data (which is why parameterized queries stop SQL injection). An LLM has no such separation: everything — your system prompt, the user's message, a retrieved web page, a tool's output — arrives as text the model interprets together. It cannot reliably tell "trusted instruction" from "untrusted data." This is the root cause of prompt injection (Module 2), and it's why the problem is considered fundamental and architectural rather than merely a bug awaiting a fix.

Why red-teaming is different for AI:

  • AI systems are probabilistic, not deterministic. The same input can succeed or fail across runs; "success" is often a matter of degree, not a binary. You can't just find one reproducible exploit and call it fixed.
  • The harms extend beyond classic security — not just data breaches, but harmful content, bias, misinformation, and misuse. AI red-teaming spans safety and security.
  • The attack surface is natural language plus data — anyone who can influence text the model sees can potentially influence its behavior.

The honest framing for this course: AI security is a real, growing discipline, and the defining reality is that there is no single fix for its central problem. So this course is built around defense-in-depth: understanding the threat landscape (Module 2), red-teaming systematically (Module 3), and layering defenses while governing the whole thing (Module 4) — because you reduce risk through many overlapping controls, not one silver bullet. Take AI security seriously, test your systems adversarially, and layer your defenses — that's the path to deploying AI systems that are useful without being dangerous.

Try it

Consider an AI system you build or use: What untrusted content does it read (user input, web pages, documents, emails, tool outputs)? What actions or data can it access? The intersection — untrusted input plus real capability — is where AI security risk concentrates. Note where your system is most exposed; that's what the rest of this course helps you defend.

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